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KYLLO V. UNITED STATES AND THE PARTIAL
ASCENDANCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S
FOURTH AMENDMENT
RICHARD H. SEAMON*
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government ...

will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home.--Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
INTRODUCTION

The recent terrorist attacks on the United States will inspire a call for
intrusive, new surveillance technology.' When used by the government, this
2
technology strains the Fourth Amendment. That is because the technology
* Visiting Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University; Associate Professor of Law,
University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that, as an
Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States from 1990-1996, I was involved in several lower
court cases involving the issue that was before the Court in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038
(2001), and represented the United States before the Court in two of the cases discussed in this Article,
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366
(1993). The views expressed in this Article are, of course, mine alone.
1. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha & Jonathan Krim, Privacy, Security Trade-Offs Reassessed:
Objections to Surveillance Technology FaceNew Test Afier Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at El
("Just two days after the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, some people are reassessing the trade-offs
between privacy and security.").
2. The Fourth Amendment says:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the Fourth Amendment itself governs only searches and seizures by
the federal government, it applies to the States because it is incorporated into the Due Process Clause
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often can enable the government to gather information in ways that are hard
to analyze under a provision that seems to address physical interferences with
tangible things (i.e., "searches" and "seizures" of "persons, houses, papers,
and effects"). 3 Illustrating the strain, the government's use of an electronic
listening device prompted the United States Supreme Court to modify the
definition of a Fourth Amendment "search" in the landmark case of Katz v.
United States.4 Recently, the Court again confronted the question of whether
government surveillance technology constituted a "search" in Kyllo v. United
States.5 The thesis of this Article is that Kyllo reflects a significant, though
subtle, departure from Katz, for which Justice Scalia is primarily responsible.
The facts of Kyllo provide a good metaphor for the Court's decision in
that case. In Kyllo, a federal law enforcement agent aimed a thermal imager
at the outside of Danny Kyllo's house. 6 On the surface, Kyllo's house was
probably as unremarkable as his neighbors' houses. By comparing the heat
radiating from the surface of his house to that radiating from his neighbors'
houses, however, the agent determined that something unusual-indeed
illegal-was going on inside.7
The Court's decision in Kyllo, like Kyllo's house, appears unremarkable
on the surface. The Court in Kyllo held by a 5-to-4 vote that the thermal
imaging of Kyllo's house constituted a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.8 Although the vote was close, and the voting alignment
was unusual, the majority as well as the dissent claimed merely to be
applying the well-established test announced in Katz, under which
government conduct constitutes a search when it interferes with an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 9 The Kyllo majority and
dissent seemed to disagree primarily on how to apply the Katz test to
surveillance technology that makes measurements "off the wall" but does not
penetrate "through the wall," of a house.' This point of dispute centered on a
of the Fourteenth Amendment as one of the "libert[ies]" protected by that Clause. See Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Shawn C. Helms, TranslatingPrivacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sct. &
TECH. L. 288, 291-300 (2001) (describing a variety of sophisticated surveillance technology).
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 (3d ed. 1996) (calling Katz a "landmark" case).
5. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
6. Id. at 2041.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2046.
9. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the "Katz test... has come to mean the test enunciated by
Justice Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
(applying "two-part inquiry" of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz).
10. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044 (discussing dissent's argument that "off the wall" technology
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narrow distinction that the Court's post-Katz case law did not unequivocally
resolve.
Despite superficial appearances, when you compare the doctrinal
emanations from the Kyllo decision with those from the Court's other recent
Fourth Amendment decisions, you can see two significant shifts. First, Kyllo
shows that a majority of the Court shares Justice Scalia's doubt about the
usefulness of the Katz test. Second, Kyllo reinforces the Court's tendency in
the last ten years to narrow the class of cases in which warrantless searches
are treated as presumptively unconstitutional. In these two ways, Kyllo
reflects an ascendance of Justice Scalia's view of the Fourth Amendment.
This ascendance is only partial, however. Although the Kyllo majority
avoided the Katz test because the application of that test would undermine
home privacy, the Court did not expressly repudiate Katz. Moreover, the
Kyllo majority did not replace the Katz test with the original-understanding
approach that Justice Scalia advocates. Furthermore, although Kyllo
reinforces the narrow warrant presumption that Justice Scalia favors, the
Court does not seem ready to adopt Justice Scalia's view that the common
law is the primary determinant of when the Fourth Amendment requires
search warrants.
This Article examines Kyllo in four steps. Part I briefly describes the facts
and procedural history of the case. Part II examines the facets of the majority
and dissenting opinions that will receive the most attention from lower courts
and practitioners. Part II examines Kyllo beneath the surface to demonstrate
its doctrinal importance.
I.

THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF KYLLO

Just as the government's war on alcohol fueled new methods of
surveillance during Prohibition," so has the government's war on drugs since
the 1980s. 12 Kyllo reflects a small skirmish in the latter war, in which the
government attempted to achieve victory by using one form of technology to
39-51 and
should be treated differently from "through the wall" technology). See also infra notes
in
technology
the
to
majority
and
dissent
the
of
approaches
the
(contrasting
accompanying text
question).
gather
11. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-57 (1928) (wiretaps used to
Act).
Prohibition
National
the
of
violations
of
evidence
used
12. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1989) (plurality opinion) (police
helicopters hovering at 400-foot altitude to see marijuana growing in backyard); United States v. Karo,
cans of ether to
468 U.S. 705, 708-10 (1984) (law-enforcement agents attached electronic beepers to
of the
Signature"
"Chemical
The
Bober,
Joseph
Peter
also
See
track suspected drug traffickers).
8 SETON HALL
Fourth Anendment: Gas Chromatography/MassSpectrometry and the War on Drugs,
CONST. L.J. 75, 76-82 (1997) (describing use of chemical testing in war on drugs).

1016

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 79:1013

detect another form.13
Some people use high-intensity lamps to grow African violets; Danny
Kyllo used them to grow marijuana. 14 Suspecting as much, a federal agent
parked across the street from Kyllo's home in Florence, Oregon, late one
night in 1992 and scanned it with a thermal imager. 15 As described by the
Court, a thermal imager "detect[s] infrared radiation [and] ....converts the
radiation into [visual] images based on relative warmth."' 16 The thermal
imager used on Kyllo's house indicated that the roof over his garage and a
side wall of his house were hot compared to the surfaces of the neighboring
homes. 17 Based on this information and other evidence, including Kyllo's
utility bills, federal agents obtained a warrant to search Kyllo's house.' 8 The
search revealed
an indoor marijuana-growing operation with more than 100
9
plants. 1
Kyllo was prosecuted for the federal crime of manufacturing marijuana.20
He moved to suppress from his prosecution the evidence found in the search
of his home.2 1 He argued that the evidence was seized under a warrant that
rested on information gathered in an unconstitutional search-namely, the
warrantless thermal imaging of his house. 22 This argument posed the
question whether the use of the thermal imager was a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.23
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government's use
of a thermal imager on Kyllo's house was not a search.24 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this holding,25 even though the
13. The government was victorious in the sense that it discovered Kyllo committing a crime. By
the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the government had unreasonably searched Kyllo's
house in the process of discovering his crime, Kyllo had served one month in jail. Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Rule out High-Tech Probe, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, June 12, 2001, at AS (reporting that Kyllo
had spent one month in jail as of time of Court's decision).
14. Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at2041.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.(stating that Kyllo was indicted on one count of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
21. Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at2041.
22. See id.
23. See id. After the trial court denied Kyllo's suppression motion, he entered a conditional
guilty plea, preserving the Fourth Amendment issue for appeal.
24. Id. See also Kyllo v. United States, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998) (original panel opinion,
later withdrawn); Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (later panel opinion approving
the search).
25. 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) (order granting certiorari).
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Ninth Circuit's decision did not conflict with that of any other federal courts
of appeals.26

II.

KYLLO ON THE SURFACE

On the surface, Kyllo does not break much new ground or reflect any
deep division on the Court. In holding that the government's thermal imaging
of a private home constituted a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, a
from
five-member majority announced a rule that, they claimed, was derivedKatz.
27
in
result
the
with
accords
indeed
that
and
test
the well-settled Katz
The four-member dissent ostensibly disagreed with the majority only on how
to apply the Katz test to surveillance technology that operates by taking
measurements "off the walls" of a house, rather than penetrating "through the
walls. ' 2 8 The disagreement thus seemed to center on a particular feature of
the technology at issue, with the majority favoring a result that better
protected home privacy.
29
The voting alignment was odd, as many commentators observed. Justice
Scalia wrote for a majority--consisting also of Justices Souter, Thomas,
30
a criminal defendant.
Ginsburg, and Breyer-that reached a result favoring
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent that endorsed the government's position and
that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy.31 Contrary to the impression conveyed by the popular press, this
32
alignment was not unprecedented. Justice Scalia had voted to uphold
26. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2049 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that all federal courts of
appeals to decide the issue had held that thermal imaging of a home is not a search, except for one
Tenth Circuit decision that had been vacated and decided on other grounds); Brief in Opposition at 78, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001) (No. 99-8508).
27. 121 S. Ct. at 2046.
28. Id. at 2052.
29. See, e.g., David Cole, Scalia'sKind of Privacy,THE NATION, July 23, 2001, at 6, availableat
2001 WL 2132778 (characterizing Kyllo as "[o]ne of the most surprising decisions" of the Term with
Justice Scalia "ruling in favor of a criminal defendant .... In the most unlikely collaboration of the
year."); Linda Greenhouse, Privacy Is Winner Against Technology in Court's Ruling, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, June 18, 2001, at 6A, available at 2001 WL 9362604 (noting that Kyllo "was not the usual
5-4, conservative-liberal split"); Jennifer Liebman & Anne Stopper, Supreme Court Review: The
Biggest Cases of the Term, LEGAL TIMES, July 2, 2001, at 12 (noting the "odd alliance" composing the
majority in Kyllo); Jeffrey Rosen, A Victory for Privacy, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at AI8
(observing that Justice Scalia "is not ordinarily celebrated by liberals for his devotion to the right to
privacy," which made his decision for majority in Kyllo notable); Eric J. Sinrod, Supreme Court Looks
at a Hot Privacy Issue, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2001, at 5 (stating that Kyllo surprisingly pits Justice
Antonin Scalia on the side of individual privacy rights and Justice John Paul Stevens on the side of law
enforcement" and that "[t]he grouping of the dissenting justices reveals some strange bedfellows").
30. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046-47.
31. See id. at 2047.
32. See supranote 29 (citing press commentary on Kyllo).
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individual privacy interests over government interests in prior Fourth
Amendment cases,33 and Justice Stevens had voted in favor of the
government in prior Fourth Amendment cases.34 Even so, the unusual voting
alignment in Kyllo suggested that something unusual was taking place.
Perhaps partly to counteract suggestions that the Court was breaking
significant new ground, the majority's opinion depicted the case as requiring
only a "refinement" of precedent in light of new technology. 35 The majority
admitted that the Court has had trouble identifying "searches" under the Katz
test.36 The majority assured us, however, that, "[w]hile it may be difficult to

refine Katz" for use in contexts outside of the home, no such difficulty
existed "in the case of the search of the interior of a home."37 In that setting,
the Court explained: "[T]here is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists and that is

acknowledged to be reasonable."38 To preserve this "individual" expectation,
the majority announced a rule: "[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use."3 9 This rule, the majority promised,

33. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 307, 313-23 (1997) (opinion joined by Justice
Scalia holding that Georgia drug-testing program for certain candidates for public office violated the
Fourth Amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-87 (1989)
(Justice Scalia dissenting, in opinion joined by Justice Stevens, from decision upholding warrantless
drug-testing of certain railroad employees); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323-29 (1987) (majority
opinion by Justice Scalia holding that police's cursory inspection of stereo equipment suspected to be
stolen violated the Fourth Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387-95 (1997) (holding, in opinion written
for majority by Justice Stevens, that police officer's "no knock" entry into hotel room did not violate
the Fourth Amendment); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130-41 (1990) (holding, in opinion
written for majority by Justice Stevens, that "plain view" doctrine did not require police to come
across seized evidence inadvertently); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 80-89 (1987) (holding, in
opinion written for majority by Justice Stevens, that police did not violate Fourth Amendment when
they searched apartment separate from the one for which warrant authorized a search).
35. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043 (purporting to "refine" Katz test for use in cases involving "the
search of interior of homes"). But see infra Part III.A (arguing that, instead of refining Katz test, Kyllo
actually departs from Katz test).
36. See id. ("The Katz test-whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable-has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and
unpredictable.").
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis in the original).
39. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also id. at 2046 ("Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."); id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
sentence quoted in text accompanying this note as "a rule that is intended to provide essential
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would ensure "preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.4 ° Couched as a
"refine[ment]" of Katz with "roots deep in the common law," the majority's
rule sounds familiar and reassuring.
The majority cited Katz not only in framing its rule of decision, but also
in refuting the dissent's "leading point."41 The dissent's leading point was
that thermal imaging detects "only heat radiating from the external surface of
the house.' 4 2 The dissent reasoned that, because the heat is exposed to the
public, its measurement cannot interfere with any reasonable expectation of
privacy under the Katz test.43 The majority countered that, under this
reasoning, the result in Katz was wrong. Katz held that a search occurred
when the government used an "eavesdropping device [that] picked up only
sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth. 4 The thermal
imager likewise measured only heat waves that reached the exterior of
Kyllo's house. The Kyllo majority admitted that the thermal imager "was
relatively crude," but the majority explained, "[T]he rule we adopt must take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development." a5 This explanation suggests the majority is not just abiding by
Katz, but extending it.
The dissent in Kyllo, like the majority, depicted the difference between it
and the majority as a narrow dispute about the proper application of the Katz
test. The dissent relied primarily on Katz's statement that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.' 4 6 The dissent observed that, in
cases after Katz, the Court had relied on this principle to hold that no Fourth
Amendment search occurred when the government rummaged through a bag
of trash that a homeowner left on the sidewalk; when the government
conducted aerial surveillance of someone's backyard; or when the
government observed smoke emanating from a chimney.47 In these cases, the
guidance" for future, more sophisticated forms of surveillance technology).
40. Id. at 2043.
41. Id.at2044.
42. Id. at 2044 (quoting Brief for the United States at 26).
43. See id. at 2048 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Heat waves, like aromas that are generated in a
kitchen, or a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A
subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible but also surely not 'one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.") (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
44. Id. at 2044.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2047 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S.

at 351)).
47. See id. at 2047 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dissent discerned "a distinction of constitutional magnitude between
'through-the-wall surveillance' that gives the observer or listener direct
access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and the thought
processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain, on
the other hand.'A8 The dissent accordingly would not treat surveillance
technology as a search "unless it provide[d] its user with the functional
equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched.'A 9 Under this
standard, the dissent considered thermal imaging to be outside the Fourth
Amendment because it operated in a passive way and the information it
gathered was too crude. 50 Other than excluding thermal imaging from Fourth
Amendment protection, however,51 the dissent's test did not seem much
different from that of the majority.
To judges and practitioners who will confront Kyllo in the future, the
decision will likely appear to involve only legal line-drawing about which
reasonable minds differed.52 The majority and dissent each apparently and
plausibly understood the Katz test to require Fourth Amendment scrutiny of
government surveillance methods that are comparable to physical intrusions
into the home. The majority and dissent differed only on whether thermal
imaging was enough like a physical intrusion to trigger the Fourth
Amendment. The difference between the majority and the dissent seems to
matter mainly for passive detection devices like thermal imagers. Future
litigation in lower courts will probably focus on the meaning, rather than the
derivation, of the majority's rule.53

48. Id. at 2047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 2048 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As still images from the infrared scans show ... no
details regarding the interior of petitioner's home were revealed. Unlike an x-ray scan, or other
possible 'through the wall' techniques, the detection of infrared radiation emanating from the home did
not accomplish 'an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises'....") (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)); id. at 2049 ("Since what was involved in this case was
nothing more than drawing inferences from off-the-wall surveillance, rather than any 'through-thewall' surveillance, the officers' conduct did not amount to a search and was perfectly reasonable.").
51. See id. at 2046 ("The dissent's proposed standard-whether the technology offers the
'functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched'-would seem quite similar to our
own at first blush.") (citation omitted); id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's
"rule" is "intended to provide essential guidance for the day when more sophisticated systems gain the
ability to see through walls and other opaque barriers") (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. See, e.g., David Cole, supra note 29, at 6 (calling Kyllo "a close case, as Justice John Paul
Stevens's quite reasonable dissent shows").
53. As the Kyllo dissent observed, the majority's rule can be broken down into four elements,
each of which will no doubt raise future questions. See 121 S. Ct. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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III. KYLLO BENEATH THE SURFACE
Beneath its surface, Kyllo is important because it vindicates Justice
Scalia's view of the Fourth Amendment in two ways. First, Kyllo endorses
Justice Scalia's criticism of the Katz test. Second, Kyllo continues the Court's
trend of narrowing the class of cases in which warrantless searches are
presumptively invalid. Although these developments do not totally vindicate
Justice Scalia's view of the Fourth Amendment, they produce a Fourth
Amendment that differs dramatically from the one that existed when he
joined the Court.
A. Kyllo and Katz
Although the Kyllo majority purported to "refine" the Katz test, the
majority actually departed from that test.54 The majority did so to avoid a
problem with the test that Justice Scalia identified in prior opinions which did
not command a majority. The departure does not, however, reflect a
complete victory for Justice Scalia. For one thing, this departure only occurs
in a limited context (i.e., when use of the Katz test would undermine
privacy). Moreover, the Kyllo majority did not adopt the analysis that Justice
Scalia would use instead of the Katz test.
1. The Extent to Which Kyllo EndorsesJustice Scalia s Fourth
Amendment
The Katz test "has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan's
separate concurrence in Katz."5 5 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan said that
government conduct is a search when it interferes with an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. 56 Under that test, the government
conducted a search when it used a microphone attached to the outside of a
phone booth to hear Katz's end of a telephone conversation; it did not matter
that this surveillance method did not require physical invasion of any private
space. 57 Thus in Katz, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard

54. See Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2043 (remarking on the difficulty of"refin[ing]" Katz for use in other
contexts, but finding no such difficulty in context of search of interior of home).
concurring). See, e.g., California v.
55. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (applying "two-part inquiry" of Justice Harlan's concurrence in

Katz).
56. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reading the majority's opinion, as well as Court's
precedent, to establish that "aperson has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy").
57. See id. at 353 ("The fact that the electronic device employed ...did not happen to penetrate
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replaced a standard that initially "was tied to common-law trespass" ' S and
that, at the time of Katz, still seemed to require physical penetration into a
constitutionally protected area. 9
Justice Scalia criticized the Katz test for three reasons in a concurring
60
opinion, which was joined only by Justice Thomas, in Minnesota v. Carter.
First, he said, the test "has no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth
Amendment." 6' Second, he charged that the test is "notoriously unhelpful" in
identifying what government conduct constitutes a search.62 Third, he labeled
the test "self-indulgent" because it allows judges, and63especially the Justices,
to decide what privacy expectations are "reasonable."
Speaking for the majority in Kyllo, Justice Scalia acknowledged his prior
criticism of the Katz test. The Kyllo majority observed, "The Katz test... has
64
often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable."
The majority cited, among other published criticism, Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Carter.65 Of course, the Kyllo majority's acknowledgment of
the criticism is not the same as endorsement of it. Immediately after this
acknowledgment, however, the majority admitted, "[I]t may be difficult to
refine Katz when the search of areas such as telephone booths, automobiles,
or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences are [sic] at issue
.
*...,66
Thus, far from refuting the criticism of Katz, the majority at least
weakly endorsed it outside the context of the case before it.
More importantly, the Kyllo majority did not apply the Katz test to the
case before it. Under the Katz test, the sole inquiry should have been whether
Kyllo reasonably expected the relative warmth of his roof and a side of his
house to remain private.67 The reasonableness of any such expectation
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.").
58. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2042.
59. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1961) (holding that government's
electronic eavesdropping constituted a search because it involved "unauthorized physical penetration
into the premises"; finding it unnecessary to determine "whether or not there was a technical trespass
under the local property rules relating to party walls").
60. 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. Id. See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729-30 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (criticizing majority's approach to determining whether government employees have
reasonable expectations of privacy in their offices because majority's ad hoe, "case-by-case" approach
created difficulties for lower courts, the police, and citizens).
63. Carter,525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (criticizing lower court for using
multi-factor test to determine whether defendant could claim Fourth Amendment protection; sole
factor was whether he reasonably expected privacy in place searched); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
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depended partly on whether thermal imagers were in general public use in
1992, when Kyllo's house was scanned. 68 The Kyllo majority mentioned this
factor but did not treat it as essential to the analysis. 69 To the contrary, the
majority said that whether a type of surveillance technology is in general
public use only "may be a factor." 70 Furthermore, the majority implied that it
mentioned the factor only because it was forced to do so by precedent. 7'
More fundamentally, the majority could not have meant its ruling to last only
until thermal imagers come into general use. Such a ruling would hardly
serve the majority's objective of "tak[ing] the long view" by deciding the
case in a way that would "assure" preservation of that degree of privacy
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
against government
72
adopted."
I believe that the Kyllo majority avoided the Katz test to avoid the
problem that is so well illustrated by its application to the facts of Kyllo. The
the Katz test, as the Kyllo majority recognized, is that the test is
problem with
"circular." 73 Under the test, the less privacy we have-because of technology
such as thermal imaging, for example-the less we can reasonably expect.
As our reasonable expectations of privacy decrease, the types of government
intrusions that will be found to fall outside of the Fourth Amendment (as not
constituting searches) increases. Thus, when courts apply the Katz test in this
"reverse"' mode-i.e., to conclude that government conduct is not a search
for Fourth Amendment purposes-the test is not just circular; it causes a
207, 211 (1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-214 (emphasizing that government aerial observation of
defendant took place from publicly navigable airspace).
69. See id. at 2046 n.6 (internal cross-reference omitted).
The dissent argues that we have injected potential uncertainty into the constitutional analysis by
noting that whether or not the technology is in general public use may be a factor . ... That
quarrel, however, is not with us but with this Court's precedent. See [Californiav.] Ciraolo,[476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986)] ('In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is
routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally
protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1000 feet'). Given that we
can quite confidently say that thermal imaging is not "routine," we decline in this case to
reexamine that factor.

Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See id. (stating that dissent's criticism of majority's reliance on "general public use" factor is
a quarrel "not with us but with this Court's precedent").
72. Id. at 2043. See also id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "general public use"
factor is "somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than
recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.").
73. Id. at 2043. Cf Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) ("[It would, of course, be
merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate
depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases.").
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downward spiral in Fourth Amendment protection.'
The reverse Katz test undermines the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches, as Justice Scalia has described that
purpose. Speaking only for himself in Minnesota v. Dickerson, Justice Scalia
said: "The purpose of the provision. . . is to preserve that degree of respect
for the privacy of persons ... that existed when the provision was adoptedeven if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all
sorts of intrusion 'reasonable.' 75 The first part of the statement in Dickerson
is echoed in Justice Scalia's expression, in the Kyllo majority opinion, of a
desire to "assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted., 76 The second part of
his statement in Dickerson, concerning our "less virtuous age," presages the
Kyllo majority's concem77 with the "power of technology to shrink the realm
of guaranteed privacy."
In short, Kyllo recognizes the problem with the reverse Katz test that
Justice Scalia previously had identified and avoids the test to avoid
undermining what Justice Scalia previously had identified as the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches. Justice
Scalia had identified the problem with reverse Katz and the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment in opinions in which he spoke for less than a majority,
and sometimes only for himself. In Kyllo, in contrast, he spoke for the
majority. In this respect, Kyllo reflects an ascendance of Justice Scalia's view
of the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Extent to Which Kyllo Does Not EndorseJustice Scalia 's Viev
of the FourthAmendment
The ascendance described above is only partial. While the Kyllo majority
departed from the reverse Katz test, the majority did not adopt Justice
Scalia's approach to identifying a Fourth Amendment "search." Nor does
Kyllo signal a rejection of "positive" uses of the Katz test.
Justice Scalia's approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation relies on its
text as it was originally understood. He said in Dickerson that the words of

74. See id. at 2042 (explaining that, although the Court in Katz concluded that electronic
eavesdropping of a conversation in telephone booth constituted a search, the Court in later cases used
Katz "somewhat in reverse" to conclude that certain government actions did not constitute a search).
75. 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. 121 S. Ct. at 2043. See also id. at 2046 ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted .... ") (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
77. Id. at 2043.
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the Fourth Amendment "must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the
time of their ratification." 78 Thus, to determine whether government conduct
constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search," Justice Scalia would rely
primarily on the original understanding of the word "search." 79 Justice Scalia
might also treat as a "search" conduct that is substantially equivalent to
conduct traditionally understood as a search.80
The Kyllo majority did not entirely follow Justice Scalia's approach.
Rather, the majority used an amalgam of Justice Scalia's approach and the
Katz test. The majority adopted a "criterion" that, consistent with Katz,
reflects the current expectations of privacy----"the minimal expectation of
81
privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable." Yet the
majority also claims that this criterion had "roots deep in the common law"
and would "assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against
82
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." It
might make sense to link modem privacy expectations to framing-era privacy
There is
expectations if there were not much difference between them.
it. 83
knew
majority
the
and
however,
difference,
big
a
obviously
In leavening Justice Scalia's approach with the Katz test, Kyllo may show
concern by some Justices in the Kyllo majority that Justice Scalia's approach
does not always protect privacy better than the Katz test. In his concurrence
in Carter, for example, Justice Scalia used his original-understanding
approach to conclude that temporary visitors to a home could not challenge a
search of the home that occurred during their visit.84 Despite that conclusion,
five Justices in Carter relied on the Katz test to conclude that a temporary
social visitor usually can contest such searches. 85 Among those five were two

78. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., concurring).
79. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2042 & n.1 (observing that visual observation of the outside of a
house would be a "search" as that term was originally understood). Cf California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 624-27 (1991) (in opinion for majority by Scalia, J., construing the term "seizure" in the
Fourth Amendment based on original understanding of that term).
80. Cf Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (stating that judgment of reasonableness of a search might be
affected by technological developments post-dating adoption of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment).
81. SeeKyllo, 121 S.Ct. at2043.
82. Id.
83. See id. ("It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
") See also
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology ....
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1764 (2001) (recognizing privacy interests implicated by
electronic eavesdropping but striking down provision in federal wire-tap statute that criminalized
disclosure of illegally intercepted communication on ground that, as applied to case before it,
provision violated First Amendment).
84. See Carter,525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Respondents here were not searched in
'their... hous[e]' under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the remotest relationship to the
well-understood meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
concurring) ("[M]y view [is] that almost all social guests have a
85. See id. at 99 (Kennedy, J.,

1026

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 79:1013

Members who joined Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Kyllo-Justices Souter and Ginsburg.86
Kyllo thus avoided using the reverse Katz test because its use would have
undermined the privacy traditionally expected in the home. Accordingly,
Kyllo does not signal that the Court would repudiate a "positive" use of the
Katz test-as occurred in Katz itself-to extend Fourth Amendment
protection beyond that afforded under a common-law approach to defining a
"search." Even so, this limited departure from the "settled rule" of Katz7 occurring as it did in "the prototypical and hence most common litigated area
of protected privacy," a search involving the interior of a home 8 represents
a significant change in Fourth Amendment law. Justice Scalia is chiefly
responsible for that change.
B. Kyllo and the WarrantRequirement
1. Kyllo's Reinforcement of a Narrow WarrantPresumption
Kyllo not only avoided the reverse Katz test, but also suggested that the
test was developed "to preserve somewhat more intact [the Court's] doctrine
that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional." 9 In the last
decade, the Court has abandoned the broad principle that all warrantless
searches are presumptively unconstitutional.9" Justice Scalia has played a
major role in that trend.91 Kyllo reinforces that trend by departing from the
reverse Katz test, thereby discouraging its use to shore up a broad warrant
presumption, and by articulating a narrow version of the presumption.
Until about 1990, the Court often said that all warrantless searches were
presumptively unconstitutional, even while the Court recognized many
situations in which the presumption was overcome. 92 A classic statement of
legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's
home."); id. at 109 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I think it noteworthy that five Members of the Court
would place under the Fourth Amendment's shield, at least, 'almost all social guests ..... '") (quoting
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Carter).
86. See id. at 106.
87. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The settled rule is that the requisite connection is an
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.").
88. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at2043.
89. Id. at 2042.
90. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (referring to the "requirement that
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer"); United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) ("Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable though the
Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585 (1979) ("Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are
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the presumption comes from Katz, in which the Court said: "[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
93
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." The
94 At the same time, the
Court quoted that statement in many later opinions.
Court expanded the number and scope of what had95 begun as "a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Justice Scalia called the Court on this inconsistency in his concurring
opinion in California v. Acevedo. 96 In that opinion, he contended that the
Court had "lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
' 97
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone. Because of the Court's
erratic path, he charged, "the 'warrant requirement' had become so riddled
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.",98
Justice Scalia's criticism apparently hit home. The majority's 1991
opinion in Acevedo appears to be the last one stating the warrant presumption
in the broad form that he criticized. 99 In the last ten years, the broad version
100
of this presumption seems to appear only in dissents. Apparently thanks to
Justice Scalia's criticism in Acevedo, the broad version of the presumption
seems to have died from embarrassment.
condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the [Fourth] Amendment."); Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) ("The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the
Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and
disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search."); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("There is no more basic constitutional rule in the Fourth
Amendment area than that which makes a warrantless search unreasonable except in a few 'jealously
and carefully drawn' exceptional circumstances.") (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499
(1958)).
93. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
94. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S.
17, 19-20 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1980). See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S.
559, 568-69 & n.2 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing precedent from 1972 and earlier supporting
"our longstanding warrant presumption").
95. 389 U.S. 347, 357. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman 's"Fourth Amendment: Privacyor
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1752 (1994) (noting the
abundance of academic commentary criticizing Court for "riddling" the Warrant Clause with
exceptions).
96. 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Prior to criticizing the
broad warrant presumption in Acevedo, Justice Scalia had himself articulated it, without criticism, in
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "as a general rule
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable") (emphasis in original). Perhaps this prior acquiescence
reflected that Ortega was one of the earliest Fourth Amendment cases in which Justice Scalia
participated after joining the Court.
97. 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. Id.
99. Id.at 580.
100. See, e.g., White, 526 U.S. at567 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Acevedo, Justice Scalia not only criticized the broad warrant
presumption, but also blamed it for the reverse Katz test. He said, "Our
intricate body of law regarding 'reasonable expectation of privacy' has been
developed largely as a means of creating these [warrant] exceptions, enabling
a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment 'search' and therefore
not subject to the general warrant requirement."'' Justice Scalia repeated this
view, speaking for the majority in Kyllo, when he suggested that the Court
had applied the Katz test "somewhat in reverse," "perhaps in order to
preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are
presumptively unconstitutional."' 0 2 In Justice Scalia's view, the reverse Katz
test enabled the Court to uphold warrantless government investigative
methods without having to recognize new warrant exceptions that would
03
destroy the illusion of a broad warrant presumption.1
If this view is correct, Kyllo should help prevent a resuscitation of the
broad warrant presumption. As discussed in the last section, Kyllo avoided
the reverse Katz test. By doing so, it furnishes precedent discouraging a use
of that test to shore up the illusion that a broad warrant presumption exists.
To put it in Machiavellian terms, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in
Kyllo prevents the Court from using the reverse Katz test as an "out" (i.e., as
a way to uphold warrantless government surveillance methods of which the
Court approves without recognizing new warrant exceptions in order to
uphold them).
Justice Scalia also participated in articulating a new, narrow version of the
presumption in his opinion for the majority in Vernonia School District47J
v. Acton. t' 4 In upholding warrantless drug testing of public school athletes,
Justice Scalia wrote for the Vernonia Court: "Where a search is undertaken
by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,
this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a
judicial warrant."105 He emphasized, however, that "a warrant is not required
to establish the reasonableness of all government searches."' 0 6 Vernonia
almost creates a reverse warrant presumption; the Fourth Amendment
generally does not require a search warrant except for searches conducted by
law-enforcement officials for evidence of crime.
Since Vernonia, the Court has usually invoked the warrant presumption

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2042.
See id. at 2042-43.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 653 (citations omitted).
Id.
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only in cases involving searches of the home, as it did in Kyllo, in which the
Court said that searches of homes are "presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant."' 1 7 Such statements do not deny the existence of the presumption in
all other settings. For example, the Court presumably would continue to
apply at least a weak warrant presumption to government searches of
ordinary businesses for evidence of crime. 0 8 Nonetheless, Kyllo suggests
that the current Court applies the warrant presumption especially vigorously
to searches of the home, which the Court considers "the prototypical ... area
Kyllo may also signal a balkanization
of protected privacy."' 0 9 In 1this
0 respect,
of the Fourth Amendment.'
In short, when Kyllo is examined closely and in the context of the Court's
jurisprudence, it is an important case not only because it departs from the
reverse Katz test, but also because it reinforces the narrowing of the once
broad warrant presumption in two ways. First, by departing from the reverse
Katz test, Kyllo may block future resort to that test as a means of shoring up
the illusion of a broad warrant presumption. Second, Kyllo articulates the
new, narrow version of the presumption, under which the warrant
requirement applies most stringently to searches of the home.
2. The PartialAscendance ofJustice Scalia 's View on When
ReasonablenessRequires a Warrant
Kyllo shows that a majority of the Court shares Justice Scalia's solicitude
for the home and his resulting insistence that warrants are usually required
for the government to search homes. Read together with other precedent,
Kyllo also suggests that a majority of the Court would apply the warrant
presumption less strongly, or not at all, in other settings. Kyllo does not,
however, signal majority support for Justice Scalia's approach to determining
when the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant. Kyllo thus reflects only a
partial ascendance of Justice Scalia's view of the warrant requirement.
Just as Justice Scalia would rely primarily on original understanding to
107. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046. See also id. at 2042 ("'With few exceptions, the question whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable must be answered no.").
108. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 325 (1978) (holding that statute
authorizing warrantless searches of ordinary businesses violated Fourth Amendment; stating that the
"rule" that "warrantless searches are generally unreasonable ... applies to commercial premises as
well as homes").
109. Id. at 2043. Cf. White, 526 U.S. at 565 ("[A] warrant resumptively is required for a felony
arrest in a suspect's home.").
110. See id. at 2051 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's rule as too narrow because "a
rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment
should not be limited to a home").
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identify "searches" subject to the Fourth Amendment, he would consult the
common-law extant when the Fourth Amendment was adopted to determine
whether a search without a warrant is "unreasonable" under the
Amendment."' For him, in other words, the common law establishes a
strong presumption of whether or not a warrant is required in the situation
under analysis. He has also suggested, however, that this presumption can be
overcome. In Acevedo, he said that "changes in the surrounding legal rules
(for example, elimination of the common-law rule that reasonable, good-faith
belief was no defense to absolute liability for [a government official's]
trespass) may make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once
was not."'12 In addition to suggesting that warrants may be required today in
situations where they were not required at common law, Justice Scalia has
suggested the converse is also true. In Dickerson, he said that technological
changes may justify dispensing with any common-law tradition that would
have required a warrant for a pat down search of the sort authorized in Terry
v. Ohio.113 Thus, Justice Scalia might allow specific legal or factual changes
to overcome the common-law presumption; however, he would not allow it
to be overcome by more generalized changes in society's notions of
4
reasonableness."t
Justice Scalia's common-law approach to determining reasonablenessincluding the determination of when reasonableness requires a warrantproduces a Fourth Amendment that is tall but narrow compared to the Fourth
Amendment that has been produced by the combination of a broad warrant
presumption and the Katz test." 5 In Arizona v. Hicks, for example, Justice
Scalia would not tolerate even minor warrantless searches of a home unless
they fell within a traditional exception, such as the exception for exigent
11.See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing "the first principle that the
'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law
afforded"); id. ("I have no difficulty with the proposition that [Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
Clause] includes the requirement of a warrant, where the common law required a warrant.
.
112. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
113. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[E]ven if a 'frisk' prior to arrest would have been considered impermissible in 1791
[when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted]. ...perhaps it is only since that time that concealed
weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm's reach have become
common-which might alter the judgment of what is 'reasonable' under the original standard.").
114. See id. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that interpretation of Fourth Amendment should
not change merely because "a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all
sorts of intrusion 'reasonable'). But cf.Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 687 (referring to the "coarsening of our
national manners that ultimately gives the Fourth Amendment its content").
115. For the insight that Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment is "tall but narrow," I thank William
C. Bryson, former Deputy Solicitor General and current Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.
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circumstances. t 16 In Minnesota v. Carter,on the other hand, Justice Scalia
refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to a social visitor to a home
t7
because the common law did not do so." Justice Scalia takes a similarly
"tall but narrow" approach to searches of persons. In Minnesota v.
Dickerson, Justice Scalia doubted the constitutionality of Terry frisks without
8
common-law evidence of their validity." In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
however, Justice Scalia distinguished the government's collection of urine
samples from the plaintiffs-which he thought "could conceivably be
regarded as a search" of their persons-from the government's testing of
a
those samples, which he did not think could "realistically" be treated 1as
9
understood."
originally
was
term
search of the plaintiffs' "effects" as that
A majority of the Court, unlike Justice Scalia, does not seem ready to
t20
12
follow the common law wherever it goes. Justice Scalia wrote for the
in the last paragraph-Hicks.'
cited
cases
four
the
of
one
only
in
majority
In the three other cases cited, Carter, Dickerson, and Ferguson, Justice
22
Scalia wrote for less than a majority.' Under pressure from Justice Scalia,
and consistent with precedent, the Court will no doubt consider the original
by
116. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding, in opinion written for majority
violated Fourth
equipment
stereo
of
bottom
the
of
inspection
cursory
warrantless,
that
J.,
Scalia,
but the bottom of
Amendment; and stating: "A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing
a turntable").
as originally
117. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 92-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that,
only in
people
protected
houses"
...
"their
in
people
of
protection
understood, Fourth Amendment's
their respective houses, not in other people's houses) (emphasis in original).
of common118. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (considering absence
at 680-81
U.S.
489
Raab,
Von
also
See
frisks).
Terry
of
permissibility
the
law evidence supporting
upheld
cases
prior
in
had
Court
that
(observing
J.)
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
only for prison
warrantless bodily searches of individuals in the absence of individualized suspicion
of certain railroad
inmates and dissenting from decision upholding warrantless urine testing
employees).
See also
119. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1296 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
for the Court by
written
opinion
in
(holding,
(1999)
302-03
295,
U.S.
526
Houghton,
v.
Wyoming
not violate Fourth
Justice Scalia, that warrantless search of passenger's purse found in car did
"body searches,"
Amendment, given historical evidence supporting the practice, while distinguishing
searches of one's
which implicate "the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against
person").
in opinion
120. But cf Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1543-53 (2001) (holding,
arrest for
written for majority by Justice Souter, that Fourth Amendment did not prohibit warrantless
arrests).
such
permitting
tradition
common-law
considering
minor criminal offenses,
majority for which he
121. In Hicks, as in Kyllo, Justice Scalia was in unusual company. The
Stevens; the dissent
wrote in Hicks included Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
See Hicks, 480
Kennedy.
and
O'Connor,
Powell,
Justices
and
Rehnquist
Justice
Chief
of
consisted
alignment).
voting
U.S. at 322 (reporting
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at
122. Carter,525 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.);
dissenting alone with
379 (Scalia, J., concurring alone); Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1296 (Scalia, J.,
"effects").
and
"persons"
plaintiffs'
of
search
analyzing
opinion
respect to part of dissenting
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understanding of the Fourth Amendment in interpreting it.12 3 The majority
does not seemed prepared, however, to give original understanding as much
24

weight as Justice Scalia would give it.'

Kyllo indicates that this situation continues. The Kyllo majority purported
to decide the case using a criterion with "roots deep in the common law." 25
It also quoted Carroll v. United States,126 as Justice Scalia did in his
Dickerson concurrence,12 7 for the proposition that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
is to be construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when it was adopted. ' '128 The Kyllo majority, however, also included
words from the Carroll opinion that were omitted from Justice Scalia's
Dickerson concurrence and that require the Fourth Amendment to be
construed, not only in light of its original understanding, but also "ina
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights
of individual citizens.', 129 Consistently with these additional words from
Carroll,the Kyllo Court considered the expectation of privacy "that exists,
' 130
and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.
The Court in Kyllo claimed that it took "the long view, from the original
123. See, e.g., Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to
be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted
....
").See also, e.g., Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion) (stating that Fourth Amendment
analysis includes consideration of, among other things, "the intention of the Framers").
124. Of particular importance, if one is counting votes, Justice Scalia has not persuaded Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, who often provide the "swing votes" in close cases, that his common-law
approach should always control Fourth Amendment questions. See Carter,525 U.S. at 100 (Kennedy,
J., concurring separately from Justice Scalia's concurrence) (arguing that common-law tradition of
home privacy "has acquired over time a power and an independent significance justifying a more
general assurance of personal security in one's home, an assurance which has become part of our
constitutional tradition"); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 337-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting from majority opinion
written by Justice Scalia) (using a balancing approach to analyze validity of police's warrantless,
cursory inspection of item suspected to be stolen). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 579-80 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in case in which
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority) (expressing reservations about majority's broad rejection of
plaintiffs' "nexus theory" of standing and, unlike majority, recognizing congressional power to
"articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before");
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in case in which Justice Scalia wrote for majority) (stating, in apparent disagreement with
majority, that "[tihe common lav of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society"). See generally Marcia Coyle, Whose Court Is It,
Anyway?, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1999, at Al (discussing significance of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy in close cases).
125. Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2043.
126. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
127. 508 U.S. at 379-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. See 121 S.Ct. at 2046 (quoting Carroll,267 U.S. at 149).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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' 131 This is not just rhetoric; it
meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.'
accurately describes the amalgam of common law and modem privacy
concerns that produced the result in Kyllo. The Court's reasoning is an
amalgam, however, rather than a synthesis. The "neither fish nor fowl"
quality reflects that the ascendance of Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment is
not yet complete.

CONCLUSION

This Article is written at the beginning of the twenty-first Century and in
the opening days of what the President of the United States has called the
"first war" of the new century. 132 This is a precarious point from which to
make predictions. One must avoid overestimating the importance of events
that may seem momentous only because of their timing. On the other hand,
one must avoid underestimating the importance of events that would fall into
insignificance, but for their timing.
To avoid these dangers, it is important to recognize that, at the very least,
the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo v. United States has much more
importance than first meets the eye. On its surface, the case merely presents
the age-old problem of applying settled legal principles in a new context.
that appearance, the Court purports to resolve the case by
Consistent with
"refin[ing]"' 133 the well-established Katz test and reaching a result that is
plausible under the precedent developing that test. Beneath the surface of
Kyllo, however, one can see important changes in the Court's Fourth
Amendment analysis, including a departure from the thirty-five-year-old
Katz test and a reinforcement of a newly narrow warrant presumption.
Although we cannot clearly envision the Fourth Amendment that these
changes will produce, it is safe to say that this future Fourth Amendment will
differ significantly from the one that Justice Scalia found on joining the
Court, and that he will deserve much of the credit (or blame) for those
differences. Perhaps, regardless of our individual fears or hopes about these
changes, we can all take comfort in recognizing that a single person still has
the power to bring them about.

131. Id. at2046.
132. David Von Drehle, Reagan National Closedfor Now: Other Airports Open, on Edge, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at Al.
133. Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2043.

